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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
"AND/OR"---PLEADING--LEGIsLATION-[Missouri] .- The petition in a re-
cent case1 alleged that "the Federal Automobile Association and/or the
Federal Automobile Insurance Underwriters" was an association of sub-
scribers engaged in exchanging reciprocal insurance contracts. The court
stated at the outset that it did not understand the meaning of the term
"and/or." It condemned its use, saying that there was no reason why a
statute, contract, or legal document of any kind could not be stated in plain
English.2
There is no question that it is, at times, exceedingly difficult to ascertain
exactly what the term means. Mr. Justice St. Paul in State v. Dudley,3 said,
"such an expression in a contract amounts in effect to a direction to those
charged with construing the contract to give it such an interpretation as
will best accord with the equity of the situation and for that purpose to
use either 'and' or 'or' and to be held down to neither."4 (Italics supplied
by court.)
The use of the symbol has been condemned by numerous courts.5 An
Illinois court, in condemning its use on the grounds that it tended to con-
fuse and mislead, warned that in a close case where these words are used,
a situation may be presented that would warrant the court in reversing a
judgment or decree.6
In pleading, the use of the term has not only been condemned, but it has
sometimes been declared fatal as too vague and uncertain, or as an unau-
thorized pleading in the alternative.7 Pleading which states material facts
ambiguously or in the alternative, so that it is difficult to determine upon
which of several equally substantive averments the pleader relies for the
maintenance of his action or defense was not permitted at common law.
The same rule has been generally adopted under the codes, although
changed by statute or judicial decision in some states.8
1. State ex rel. Adler et al. v. Douglas et al. 95 S. W. (2d) 1179, (Mo.,
1936). The case was decided on a point of law entirely different from the
question here under consideration. The court's discussion of the term
"and/or" was dictum.
2. Ibid. p. 1180.
3. State v. Dudley, 159 La. 872, 106 So. 364 (1925).
4. Ibid. p. 878.
5. Preble v. Architectural Iron Workers' Union, 260 Ill. App. 435 (1931);
Bell v. Wayne United Gas Co., 181 S. E. 609 (W. Va., 1935). The court in
this case described the symbol as "a disingenuous modernistic hybrid, inept
and irritating"; City National Bank and Trust Co. v. Davis Hotel Corp.,
280 Ill. App. 247 (1935); Irving Trust Co. v. Rose, 67 F. (2d) 89 (C. C.
A. 4, 1935); Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 208 N. Y. Supp. 428 (1935);
Ex Parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. (2d) 284 (1934); Tarjan v. Na-
tional Surety Co., 268 Ill. App. 232 (1932).
6. Preble v. Iron Workers' Union, 260 Ill. App. 435 (1931).
7. Kornbrodt v. Equitable Trust Co. 137 Ore. 386, 2 P. (2d) 236 (1931).
8. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) pp. 171, 172. The common law rule has
been changed by statute in England and 6 states in this country: Conn., Ky.,
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In legislative action, its use has caused a court to declare an act uncer-
tain, and therefore invalid.9 It was held that although its use in a contract
was permissible and was equivalent to a direction that it be construed so
as to best accord with the equity of the case, such usage cannot apply to
statutes, since the legislature, in making its laws, must express its own
will and leave nothing to the mere will or caprice of the courts, particularly
in the matter of punishing offenses.' 0 But in Ex Parte Iratacable it was
held that the presence of thirty-two "and/or's" in a statute did not render
it uncertain."
George W. Wickersham, a noted member of the bar, said that the use
of the symbol in pleadings and court proceedings and in legislative acts is
utterly unjustified,' 2 and the majority of the courts seem entirely in accord
with this view. G. M.
ATTORNEYS-RULES OF COURT-RETROSPECTIVE LAws-[Missouri].-The
Missouri appelate courts in two recent cases' have been confronted with the
question whether the rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri 2 must operate
prospectively when invoked in ex parte proceedings instituted for the pur-
pose of disbarring attorneys. The Constitution of Missouri prohibits the
enactment of both ex post facto and retrospective laws. 3 In the Noel case,
the alleged professional misconduct of the respondent had occurred approxi-
mately ten years prior to the adoption of the rules of court. Therefore,
the respondent contended that those rules which provide for the investiga-
tion of conduct and which interdict certain conduct could not be invoked
against him without violating the constitutional provision to which allusion
has been made. The court, in dismissing this defense without discussion,
relied upon the Sparrow case, and held that rules of court need not operate
prospectively in cases of this character.
Mass., Mo., N. J., and N. Mexico. In at least 10 more states it has been
changed by judicial decision.
9. State v. Dudley, 159 La. 872, 106 So. 364 (1925).
10. Ibid. p. 365.
11. Ex parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. (2d) 284 (1934).
12. 18 A. B. A. Journal 574 (Sept., 1932).
1. In re Noell, 96 S. W. (2d) 213 (Mo. App. June, 1936) ; in re Sparrow,
90 S. W. (2d) 401 (Mo. Dec., 1935).
2. The rules were adopted by the Supreme Court in November, 1934. 334
Mo. (Appendix i).
3. Mo. Const. Art. 2, sec. 15. An ex post facto law has been defined as
one which makes an action done before the enactment of a statute penal or
criminal which was innocent when committed or which aggravates a crime
by making it greater than when committed or inflicts a greater punishment
than existed when the offense was committed. State ex rel. v. Works, 249
Mo. 702, 156 S. W. 967, 238 U. S. 41 (1913). The phrase ex post facto re-
lates exclusively to crimes. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 U. S. (L. ed.) 648(1798). Retroactive laws relate only to civil rights and proceedings. Glad-
ney v. Snydor, 172 Mo. 318, 72 S. W. 554 (1903). Thus, every ex post facto
law is retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law.
6 R. C. L. 303.
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